ÿþ<html xmlns:v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"> <!-- #BeginTemplate "tsnc12.dwt" --> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Language" content="en-us"> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=unicode"> <link rel="File-List" href="nc12_08_files/filelist.xml"> <title>T­p san nghiên céu Ph­t hÍc</title> <style> <!-- p.MsoNormal {mso-style-parent:""; margin-top:6.0pt; margin-right:0cm; margin-bottom:0cm; margin-left:0cm; margin-bottom:.0001pt; text-align:justify; text-justify:inter-ideograph; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:CN-Times; } .MsoBody { font-family: CN-Times; font-size: 12pt; color: #000080; word-spacing: 0; text-indent: 0; line-height: 150%; text-align: justify; margin: 0 } div.Section9 {page:Section9; } h1 {margin-top:12.0pt; margin-right:0cm; margin-bottom:3.0pt; margin-left:0cm; text-align:justify; text-justify:inter-ideograph; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:18.0pt; font-family:CN-Times; text-transform:uppercase; font-style:italic} h2 {margin:3.0pt 0cm; text-align:center; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14.0pt; font-family:CN-Times; font-weight:bold; } h3 {margin-top:6.0pt; margin-right:0cm; margin-bottom:3.0pt; margin-left:0cm; text-align:center; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:13.0pt; font-family:CN-Times; color:red; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; } span.byline {color:navy} div.Section10 {page:Section10; } span.MsoFootnoteReference {font-family:CN-Times; color:maroon; vertical-align:super} div.Section1 {page:Section1; } div.Section2 {page:Section2; } div.Section3 {page:Section3; } table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-parent:""; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; } div.Section4 {page:Section4; } div.Section5 {page:Section5; } div.Section6 {page:Section6; } div.Section7 {page:Section7; } div.Section8 {page:Section8; } --> </style> <!--[if !mso]> <style> v\:* { behavior: url(#default#VML) } o\:* { behavior: url(#default#VML) } .shape { behavior: url(#default#VML) } </style> <![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]> <xml><o:shapedefaults v:ext="edit" spidmax="1027"/> </xml><![endif]--> </head> <body style="text-align: center"> <p class="Heaing1" align="center" style="margin:0 0cm; text-align: center; "> <font face="Times New Roman"> <span style="font-weight: normal; font-style: normal">T¬P SAN</span></font></p> <h1 align="center" style="margin:0 0cm; text-align: center; "> <font color="#000080" face="Times New Roman" size="4"> <span lang="VI" style="font-style: normal">NGHIÊN CèU PH¬T HÌC</span></font></h1> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 0; margin-bottom:0"> <font face="Times New Roman" size="2"> <span lang="VI">PH¬T GIÁO THêA THIÊN - HU¾</span></font></p> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 0; margin-bottom:0"> <font face="Times New Roman" size="2"> <b><i><span lang="VI">SÑ </span>12<span lang="VI"> - Pl. 2548 - PhÕ bi¿n nÙi bÙ</span></i></b></font></p> <hr width="40%"> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 0; line-height:150%; margin-bottom:0"> &nbsp;</p> <table border="0" width="100%" id="table1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> <tr> <td><!-- #BeginEditable "body" --> <h4 style="text-align: center; margin-left: 0"><b><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:line id="_x0000_s1027" style='position:absolute;left:0;text-align:left;top:0;z-index:1; mso-position-vertical:absolute' from="5.25pt,-54pt" to="317.25pt,-54pt"/><![endif]--><![if !vml]><span style='mso-ignore:vglayout;position:absolute;z-index:1;left:6px;top:-73px; width:418px;height:2px'><img width=418 height=2 src="nc12_08_files/image001.gif" v:shapes="_x0000_s1027"></span><![endif]><font color="#000080" size="6"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">Emperor NHÂN TÔNG</span></font></b></h4> <h4 style="text-align: center; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <font color="#000080" size="6"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times"> and the War of Defense in 1285</span></font></h4> <hr width="40%"> <p class="MsoBodyText2" align="right" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 6.0pt; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times; font-style: italic">by Lê M¡nh Thát</span></p> <div style="mso-element: dropcap-dropped; mso-element-frame-width: 45.8pt; mso-element-wrap: around; mso-element-anchor-vertical: paragraph; mso-element-anchor-horizontal: column; mso-height-rule: exactly; mso-element-linespan: 2"> &nbsp;</div> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">As it has been said before, it was just in 1279 when Emperor Nhân Tông ascended the throne and the Sung Dynasty was exterminated in China that Kublai Khan gave orders for warships to be built in his plan of invading ¡i ViÇt. His intention seemed to take advantage of the victory his well-trained troops had just gained as an impetus for their campaign to smash our people s fighting power. From his own experience in the war of 1258, however, Kublai Khan s preparation of tactics and strategy for this war showed to be much more elaborate. In addition to the north-eastern and south-western armies, he attempted to form the third one south of our country by ordering So Tu to occupy Champa in 1282. In reality, the war proceeded exactly in the strategy he had planned, yet the effect was not so satisfactory as he had expected.</span></p> <h6 style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">Kublai Khan s Preparation for the War of 1285</span></h6> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Despite his failure to impose the puppet government headed by Tr§n Di Ái upon our country, Kublai Khan patiently expected a victory from the battlefield of Champa. Unfortunately, his expectation could not come true as it is noted in <i>Pen Chi</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 13, pp.2b2-3 and 2b9-11, that the defeated army of So Tu had to retreat from Champa and  <i>P ing Chang A Li Hai Ya of Hu Kwang Hsin Shêng volunteered to reach the seashore to gather beaten troops [fleeing] from Champa</i>. Obviously, in the long-termed strategy of resistance by combining fighting with negotiation, the Cham people had sunk So Tu s troops in the  swamp of a guerilla warfare in their tropical country.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Having received only requests for reinforcement in stead of some expected victory, on the 28<sup>th</sup>, inh Síu, of the 5<sup>th</sup> month of Chih Yuan 21 (1284) Kublai Khan stripped Wu Ma Er of his commanding seal due to his failure of supplying So Tu with reinforcements. Then, on the 12<sup>th</sup>, M­u Tý, of the 7<sup>th</sup> month of the same year he ordered his son, T o Huan, officially to command troops to attack Champa, as recorded in <i>Pen Chi</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 13, p.4a8. Yet, it was merely a pretense of his since the objective of T o Huan s invading troops was not Champa, but ¡i ViÇt. Just on the same day, M­u Tý, by order of Emperor Nhân Tông, the mission of Trung L°¡ng ¡i Phu NguyÅn ¡o HÍc submitted our local offerings to the Yuan king and thereby investigated their situation. Also it was the day when the Yuan king allowed our envoy, Lê Anh, to return home.</span></p> <p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">In the meantime, a powerful staff of their headquarters was formed by Kublai Khan s order. In addition to T o Huan, most of veteran generals of Mongol armed forces, who had acquired military merit in annihilating the Sung, were gathered. Among them were A Li Hai Ya, who had gained victory in Hsiang Yang, Ngoh Chou, P an Ch êng, Shêng Kiang, Kiang Ling and many other battlefields in China, and Li Hêng, who had succeeded in the Yai Shan operation, bringing the Sung Dynasty to an end; and several generals and high-ranked officers who had ever cooperated with and received aid from A Li Hai Ya such as Ao Lu Chih, Cheng P êng Fei, Wu Ma Er, So Tu, P an Chieh, and so on. Otherwise stated, Kublai Khan had a powerful staff of most talented and veteran officers in his hands.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">In the 7<sup>th</sup> month of Chih Yuan 21 (1284) when T o Huan s troops were halted at Ching Hu Chan Ch êng Hsin Shêng, Emperor Nhân Tông ordered the mission of NguyÅn ¡o HÍc to meet with him there. Thereafter, the latter ordered Ch ü Lieh (Külä) and T a Hai San Li (Taqai Sarïq) to accompany NguyÅn ¡o HÍc to our country with his letter, blaming and requesting our emperor to provide supplies for Yuan army and receive T o Huan from the border into our country on their way to attack Champa. Just as T o Huan moved his troops to Hsin Shan District of Hu Nan, Ch ü Lieh and T a Hai San Li left ¡i ViÇt, accompanied by the mission of Tr§n éc Quân and Tr§n Tñ Tông who carried the emperor s letter of refusing T o Huan s request for taking the route of our country:  <i>Whether by land or by water, traveling from my country to Champa is not convenient</i>. Upon receiving the letter, T o Huan ordered Chao Tzm Ch i to reply to Emperor Nhân Tông, requesting him to open the road and supply provisions. He was, too, informed at the same time that Tr§n H°ng ¡o had deployed troops to the border.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">In <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209, p.5b11, all of these facts are said to have occurred in the 2<sup>nd</sup> month of Chih Yuan 22 (1285) since, according to <i>Pen Chi</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 13 p.6a5, T o Huan s troops marched into our country in the 12<sup>th</sup> month of Chih Yuan 21. It is more carefully recorded in <i>An Nam Chi Luoc</i> 4, p.53:  <i>On the 21<sup>st</sup> of the 12<sup>th</sup> month the army reached the borderland of An Nam</i>. This is quite in accordance with the account in <i>Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzm Lu </i>of <i>Yuan Wen Lei</i> 41, p.27a2-3:  <i>In the 10<sup>th</sup> month of [Chih Yuan] 21, [our] troops reached Yung Chou. The An Nam [king] ordered H°ng ¡o V°¡ng to dispatch 20,000 men to their posts to halt [our] king s troops. In the 12<sup>th</sup> month, they were defeated at the frontier pass Kh£ Ly</i>. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Thus, it must be in the 10<sup>th</sup> month of Chih Yuan 21 (1284) that T o Huan and his troops reached Yung Chou of Hu Nan. There, A Li Hai Ya ordered Chao Tzm Ch i to write a letter, requesting our emperor to  <i>open the road and prepare supplies to receive Chên Nan Wang</i> , as recorded in <i> An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209, p.6a5-6. Also in the words of <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209, p.6a6-7, upon reaching Yung Chou of Kwang Hsi, T o Huan learned that the ¡i ViÇt General iÇn TiÁn Ph¡m H£i Nham had deployed troops at Kh£ Lan, Vi ¡i Trã. When the former s army reached Szu Ming of Kwang Chou, he sent a letter to Emperor Nhân Tông, repeating the same demands set forth in A Li Hai Ya s letter. Thereafter, he went on to move his troops into LÙc Châu of our country, that is, LÙc Bình District in what is now L¡ng S¡n Province.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">There, having heard that Emperor Nhân Tông had dispatched troops to the positions at the frontier passes Khâu Ôn and Khâu C¥p Lãnh, T o Huan divided his troops into two wings. According to <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 4 p.53, this took place on the 21<sup>st</sup>, Giáp Tý, of the 12<sup>th</sup> month of Giáp Thân (i.e. January 27<sup>th</sup>, 1285); the west wing commanded by Wan Hu Po Lo Ho Ta Er (Bolqadar)<a name="_ftnref1" title href="#_ftn1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: CN-Times; vertical-align: baseline">[1]</span></span></a> and A Shên (Atsin) advanced down via Khâu Ôn whereas the east wing commanded by San Ta Er Tai (Tatartai) and Wan Hu Li Ping Hsien via C¥p Lãnh.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Even at that time, Emperor Nhân Tông kept on sending a letter to T o Huan, carried by ThiÇn Trung ¡i Phu NguyÅn éc D° and TriÁu ThÉnh Lang NguyÅn Vn Hàn, demanding his army s withdrawal with the emperor s reference to an edict issued by Kublai Khan in 1261:  <i>ordering our [Yuan] troops not to enter your [An Nam] territory,</i> as recorded in <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i> Yuan Shih</i> 209, p.6a9-10. A Li Hai Ya detained NguyÅn Vn Hàn but allowed NguyÅn éc D° to return with A Li, who carried a letter from him replying to the emperor s request for their withdrawal:  <i>the reason we launch the campaign is [to punish] Champa, not An Nam</i>. Nevertheless, A Li could not approach our court since on his arrival at C¥p B£o District he encountered our troops commanded by Qu£n Quân NguyÅn LÙc, and then more troops deployed by Tr§n H°ng ¡o in Lý Village, o£n District, and V¡n Ki¿p. Being informed of this, A Li Hai Ya ordered I Jun to investigate the situation of our troops to prepare his attack. Shortly thereafter, he was reported by San Ta Er Tai, Liu Ping Hsien and Tsun Yu that they had encountered our troops counterattacks at the frontier pass Kh£ Ly. The fact above is taken from <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209 p.6a3-b2.</span></p> <h6 style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">The Battle of NÙi Bàng</span></h6> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">In this battle, Tsun Yu captured our two officers, Qu£n Quân Phång Ngñ × V) and × Hñu, and had them killed later. Then he advanced to Ùng Bàng where Yuan troops had fought with our troops and killed our general T§n Sâm. Afterwards they moved to Bi¿n Trú Village for a halt.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">According to <i>VSKTT</i>, on the 26<sup>th</sup> of the 12<sup>th</sup> month  <i>the enemy s forces attacked the frontier passes at V)nh Châu, NÙi Bàng, Thi¿t L°ãc, and Chi Lng</i>. Thus, after five days advance from LÙc Châu, the west wing of Po Lo Ho Ta Er together with T o Huan s great army completely broke through our line of defense, chiefly formed to protect Thng Long, by crossing our frontier passes in the north down to our plains in the south. According to <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209 p.6b5, to besiege and attack the frontier pass NÙi Bàng, T o Huan s troops were divided into six directions. In the words of <i>Pen Chi</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 13, p.6a5-6:  <i>That month, Chên Nan Wang s troops marched into An Nan, killing [their] frontier troops and advancing in six directions. H°ng ¡o V°¡ng of An Nam commanded his troops to counterattack</i>. </span></p> <p class="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">Accordingly, it may be said that this is a great battle, if not a strategically decisive battle. For, on our part, the troops commanded by QuÑc Công Ti¿t Ch¿ Tr§n H°ng ¡o had suffered a heavy loss with ¡i Liêu Ban oàn Thai captured alive. Later, as it will be seen below, Emperor Nhân Tông ordered Tr§n H°ng ¡o to mobilize troops from other Routes, of which troops of princes and Tr§n H°ng ¡o s son mounted to nearly 200,000. Further, the fact that Tr§n H°ng ¡o had withdrawn his troops urgently and suddenly shows that the sudden defeat on the Noi Bang front seemed to be beyond his own planning.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">In <i>VSKTT</i> 5, p.45a4-b1, the withdrawal of our troops is described rather graphically with the detail of Tó T°Ûng Y¿t Kiêu s waiting for Tr§n H°ng ¡o at Bãi Tân:  <i>Earlier, H°ng ¡o V°¡ng had two servants called Dã T°ãng and Y¿t Kiêu, who were very well treated by him. When the Yuan troops came, Y¿t Kiêu posted boats at Bãi Tân whereas Dã T°ãng followed Tr§n H°ng ¡o. When our troops were defeated, all boats were scattered. [H°ng ¡o] V°¡ng was about to retreat along the way in the foothills when Dã T°ãng said,  if he does not see you yet, surely Y¿t Kiêu will not move his boats to anywhere else. [H°ng ¡o] V°¡ng followed him to Bãi Tân, where remained Y¿t Kiêu s boats alone. So pleased, V°¡ng said,  It is due to its six strong bones supporting wings that the Great Bird can fly high. Without them, it remains merely an ordinary bird. After these words, he had his boats handled away from the enemy s pursuit. Reaching V¡n Ki¿p, he deployed troops to defend B¯c Giang</i>. This shows clearly that the front of NÙi Bàng was broken in an extremely unfavorable situation, even seemingly unexpected not only to the direct commander, Tr§n H°ng ¡o, but also to Emperor Nhân Tông, the leader and the commander-in-chief of our war of resistance at that time.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">This situation may be seen through the fact that Emperor Nhân Tông, being informed of the fighting at NÙi Bàng, gave up his breakfast, taking boat all day toward H£i ông to confer with Tr§n H°ng ¡o, as recorded in <i> VSKTT</i>:  <i>Then the king was seated in a light boat, traveling to the Route of H£i ông. It was, then, nearly at twilight but the king had not had his breakfast yet. A common soldier brought a meal with rice of bad quality for him. The king praised him to be loyal, giving him the title of  superior rank and the position of TiÃu T° at the local community of Hïu TriÁu Môn in B¡ch ±ng</i>. Obviously, the fact that Emperor Nhân Tông gave up his breakfast to hurry to H£i ông by boat shows that the front there played a very important role in the strategy of defense of the Tr§n Dynasty at that time.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">It may be said that through the fact above Emperor Nhân Tông and Tr§n H°ng ¡o s primary plan of fighting seemed to dispatch troops of defense to the positions right on the frontier of our country, a plan quite in accordance with the tactics Lý Th°Ýng KiÇt had applied more than 200 years earlier. Indeed, the defeat on the NÙi Bàng front required that Emperor Nhân Tông and Tr§n H°ng ¡o should have a new strategy in place of the old ones in facing the enemy. This must have been the reason why the emperor himself had to confer with Tr§n H°ng ¡o so urgently in H£i ông.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">What Emperor Nhân Tông and Tr§n H°ng ¡o discussed in this brief conference is not known today; yet, in the words of <i>VSKTT</i> 5 pp.44b7-45a4, following their discussion  <i>H°ng ¡o V°¡ng was ordered to mobilize troops and militiamen of the Routes in H£i ông, selecting strong men as volunteers for crossing the sea down to the south. The situation of our army became rather favorable. Hearing of this, our troops gathered from everywhere. The king wrote a poem on his bows:</i></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0"> <i><span lang="EN-US">The former event of CÑi Kê you should remember;</span></i></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0"> <i><span lang="EN-US">In Hoan Ái remain one hundred thousand of troops.</span></i></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <i><span lang="EN-US">Under Tr§n H°ng ¡o s command, H°ng Vi V°¡ng NghiÅn, Minh Hi¿n V°¡ng U¥t, H°ng Nh°ãng V°¡ng T£ng, H°ng Trí V°¡ng HiÇn concentrated troops from B±ng Hà, Na S§m, Trà H°¡ng, Yên Sinh, Long Nhã, totally 200.000 men, then moving to V¡n Ki¿p to fight against the Yuan army</span></i><span lang="EN-US">. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Thus, there really occurred some change in our army s strategic measures that would then be manifested in Emperor Nhân Tông s art of leading the war. Today, this measure is generally designated by military theorists as  <i>strategic withdrawal and strategic counterattack</i>. The urgent conference between Emperor Nhân Tông and Tr§n H°ng ¡o shortly after our defeat on the front of NÙi Bàng points out some brilliant reflection in the military aspect not only of Tr§n H°ng ¡o but also of Emperor Nhân Tông, who was acting as the commander-in-chief of our armed forces at that time. That Emperor Nhân Tông suffered hunger all day to reach Tr§n H°ng ¡o s position for conference shows how perilous the situation of our country was then. Further, it points out how closely and seriously the emperor observed the situation of our army s fighting so as to resolve on the spot whatsoever problems created by complicated and dangerous changes in various situations. That he mobilized troops from the Routes, the princes and the nobles to V¡n Ki¿p was a typical fact. The two lines of verse mentioned above indicated that Emperor Nhân Tông was unceasingly seeking to lend encouragement to Tr§n H°ng ¡o and other generals.  <i>The former event of CÑi Kê</i> refers to a historical fact in the old days when Kou Chien, head of the Yüeh state, was defeated and captured by Fou Ts ai, head of the Wu state, but the former, having suffered a great deal of hardship and humility, eventually rose to gain a victory over the latter. It should be noticed that the defeat on the NÙi Bàng front was such a great loss to our army that Emperor-Father Tr§n Thánh Tông ever asked Tr§n QuÑc Tu¥n, the general who was directly commanding our troops on the front, whether our army should surrender in such a situation; and the talented strategist replied:  <i>Your Majesty should first cut my head and then surrender</i> , as in the words of <i> VSKTT</i> 6 p.11b. The figure  200,000 men , however, shows that the force of our army remained perfectly preserved. With such a strong army, in addition to his unceasing attempt to maintain the officers morale in terms of  <i>the former event of CÑi Kê</i> , Emperor Nhân Tông kept on encouraging them through his announcement that one hundred thousand men were being concentrated in Hoan Ái for reinforcement. Indeed, according to <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209 p.6b6, after the battle of NÙi Bàng the enemy admitted  <i>H°ng ¡o V°¡ng was commanding more than 1000 warships deployed ten miles far from V¡n Ki¿p</i>. </span></p> <h6 style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">The Battle of V¡n Ki¿p</span></h6> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">T o Huan s attack on NÙi Bàng on the 26<sup>th</sup> of the 12<sup>th</sup> month of Giáp Thìn, which is dated the 27<sup>th</sup> in <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i>, must have lasted for several days. Thus, the year of Giáp Thân was coming to an end; that is to say, the greatest festival of the year was waiting for the whole people of ¡i ViÇt. Yet, all that they were preparing for the longest and most exiting holidays of the year was weapons, provisions and, above all, their unyielding spirit. The battle of NÙi Bàng ended and Tr§n H°ng ¡o retreated into V¡n Ki¿p, concentrating troops from the Routes to prepare for the coming battle. <i>VSKTT</i> 5 p.45b2-3 says:  <i>On the 6<sup>th</sup> of the 1<sup>st</sup> month of ¤t D­u, i.e. the spring of ThiÇu B£o the Seventh (1285), Wu Ma Er of the Yuan army attacked V¡n Ki¿p and Mount Ph£ L¡i. H°ng ¡o V°¡ng of An Nam, who was commanding troops of defense in V¡n Ki¿p, fought against him. Wan Hu I Jun was killed at L°u Thôn</i>. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">According to <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209 p.6b6-7, T o Huan had built factories for making warships and organized naval troops, who were commanded by Wu Ma Er to launch a major attack on V¡n Ki¿p. On their way of advance, they picked Emperor Nhân Tông s two letters sent to T o Huan and A Li Hai Ya with respect to his request that they should observe Kublai Khan s order issued in the year of Chung Tung 2 (1261) and that they had to withdraw their troops. Afterwards, A Li Hai Ya wrote a letter to Emperor Nhân Tông, requesting him to open the road for  <i>the troops of the [Yuan} court to fight Champa</i>. The letter was carried to V¡n Ki¿p by our detained messenger, NguyÅn Vn Hàn, who had just been released by the Yuan army.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Even at that moment A Li Hai Ya went on with his impudent words as recorded in <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209, pp.6b11-7a3:  <i>Leading troops to fight Champa, the [Yuan] court has repeatedly sent letters to you, asking for opening the road and preparing supplies. It is sufficiently surprising that you have opposed the order from the court, letting H°ng ¡o V°¡ng command troops to fight against and cause losses for our army. To let the people of An Nam suffer disasters, it is your country s fault. Now, the Great Army is crossing your country to fight Champa. His Majesty gives orders for you to think seriously. Your country has long been subject [to the imperial court]; you should think of His Majesty s great mercy to open the road immediately and advise the people to make their living as before. When our troops pass by, there will not be anything harmful. You should go out receiving Chên Nan Wang, discussing military affairs with him. Otherwise, the Great Army will be quartered and establish their bases in An Nam</i>. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">On the part of ¡i ViÇt, as has been mentioned above, Emperor Nhân Tông and Tr§n H°ng ¡o ordered troops from the Routes in the northeast such as H£i ông, Vân Trà, Ba iÃm, and other places, Bàng Hà, Na S§m, Trà H°¡ng, Yên Sinh, Long Nhãn to be concentrated at V¡n Ki¿p and Mount Ph£ L¡i. According to Section  S¡n Xuyên of <i>An Nam Chí Nguyên</i> 1 p.42, Mount Ph£ L¡i is  <i>situated in Të S¡n District, facing Bình Than, embraced on the left by the Nh° NguyÇt River and on the right by the Ô Cách. It is a magnificent landscape of the region</i>. Concerning Emperor Nhân Tông, he himself commanded the Thánh Dñc army of more than 1000 men to help Tr§n H°ng ¡o counterattack, as recorded in <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209, p.7a3-4.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Thus, according to <i>Pen chi</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i>, by the festival of ¤t D­u New Year Wu Ma Er had ordered a decisive blow on our base in V¡n Ki¿p, where a fierce battle occurred with the death of the Yuan General Wan Hu I Jun at L°u Thôn. This is in accordance with an account in <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209 p.6b5-6, where it says:  <i>H°ng ¡o V°¡ng fled; [our] mandarins and men pursued him to V¡n ki¿p, attacking and destroying [their hold at] the frontier pass</i>. </span></p> <h6 style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">The Battle of Bình Than</span></h6> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">According to <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 4 p.54, on the 9<sup>th</sup>, Nham Ngo, of the 1<sup>st</sup> month Emperor Nhân Tông  <i>commanded 100,000 troops in a great battle at Bài Than. Yuan Shuai Wu Ma Er, Na Hai (Naqai), and Tsun Lin Tê destroyed all the boats they had captured before</i>. Concerning the same day <i>Pen Chi</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 13 p.7a8-9 says:  <i>Wu Ma Er with his troops encountered H°ng ¡o V°¡ng s troops of An Nam and defeated them</i> , without mentioning the place. Accordingly, in the fighting at Bài Than commanded by Emperor Nhân Tông there were surely one thousand warships Tr§n H°ng ¡o had deployed about ten miles from V¡n Ki¿p as recorded above by <i>Yuan Shih</i>.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Here, Bài Than is nothing other than Bình Than because in a passage on the Bình Than River <i>An Nam Chí Nguyên</i> 1, pp.46-47, says:  <i>[The river] named Bài Than or Bình Than is in Chí Linh District. It flows from X°¡ng Giang to [its confluence with] the ThË C§u River, where they incorporate into each other to flow between Mount Chí Linh and Mount Ph£ L¡i, winding so vastly that it is hard to see its border. At the mouth of the × MÙ River, it is divided into two branches flowing into the sea</i>. In this quotation, Bài Than is transliterated according to Manuscript B cited by Gaspardone in <i>Kao I</i> on page 47.<a name="_ftnref2" title href="#_ftn2"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: CN-Times; vertical-align: baseline">[2]</span></span></a></span></p> <h6 style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">The Battle of Thng Long</span></h6> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Following the battles at V¡n Ki¿p, Ph£ L¡i and Bình Than, the enemy went on to attack Vi Ninh and ông Ng¡n and then advanced down to Gia Lâm. Meanwhile, our troops were compelled to retreat into Thng Long along the Thiên éc River, where occurred some small combats. In the words of <i>VSKTT</i> 5 p.45b3-5:  <i>On the 12<sup>th</sup> day the enemy attacked Gia Lâm, Vi Ninh, ông Ng¡n. Seeing the two words  sát thát <a name="_ftnref3" title href="#_ftn3"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><b> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: CN-Times; vertical-align: baseline"> [3]</span></b></span></a> inscribed on the arms of our troops they had captured, they got so angry that they killed a large number of them. Then they advanced into ông BÙ §u and erected their big flag there. [Our] King wanted to be informed precisely of the enemy s situation but he did not yet know who could undertake it. Realizing his intention, Chi H§u Cåc Thç × Kh¯c Chung stepped forward, saying:  Though humble and untalented, I would like to go. The King was very pleased, saying:  No one dares to say that among the horses pulling carts of salt there would not be any swift and excellent ones.</i> <i>Then Chung left, taking the letter with him</i>. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">In <i>Yuan Shih</i> 13 p.7a9, the day cited above is dated  <i>¤t D­u, when An Nam Th¿ Tí Tr§n Nh­t Huyên commanded more than 1000 warships to counterattack. On the day Bính Tu¥t, [our army] fought with [An Nam] troops and destroyed them totally. Nh­t Huyên ran away. [Our army] marched into his citadel and then went out, quartered north of the Phú L°¡ng River</i>. In the words of <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 54:  <i>On the 13<sup>th</sup> day, Bính Tu¥t, Th¿ Tí held [the position on] the Lô River but soon left because it was broken. Chên Nan Wang s troops crossed the river, entering the citadel and holding a party there.</i> The same is recorded in <i>Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzm Lu</i> in <i>Yuan Wen Lei</i> 41, p.27a4-56:  <i>Mandarins and troops reached the Phú L°¡ng River. Nh­t Huyên himself fought against them. Defeated, he left his citadel for the Thiên Tr°Ýng Prefecture. Mandarins and troops entered the capital.</i> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">In <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209, p.7a4, the battle is very clearly described:  <i>Accompanied by the mandarins of Hsin Shêng, Chên Nan Wang himself reached ông Ng¡n to command troops to fight the [An Nam] troops. [We] killed a large number of men and captured twenty boats. H°ng ¡o V°¡ng was defeated and ran away. Mandarins and troops built a bridge of connected rafts to land on the north bank of the Phú L°¡ng River. There had existed their troops and boats and wood barriers along the river. Seeing [our] mandarins and troops, they fired cannons, shouted loudly and challenged to fight. In the afternoon, NguyÅn Phång Ngñ was ordered to carry a letter to Chên Nan Wang and the official of Hsin Shêng, asking for our great army s withdrawal. The official of Hsin Shêng wrote a letter of blame and then ordered troops to advance. Nh­t Huyên fled out of the capital, but soon ordered NguyÅn HiÇu NhuÇ to come with his letter of excuse and some local gifts, asking for [our] withdrawal. The official of Hsin Shêng sent him a letter, persuading the [An Nan] army to surrender. Then he commanded troops to cross the river and halted near the An Nan capital. The following day, Chên Nan Wang entered their capital. The palaces were deserted; there remained some decrees and some letters from our Hsin Shêng, all being torn into pieces</i>. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">From the account above, we may acquire some significant remarks. First, though it was a great battle on water in which was involved an army of more than 100,000 men, the battle of Bình Than in essence was really of a  mobile warfare , that is, fighting for retreating and attracting the enemy into trap. Accordingly, when T o Huan ordered his troops to connect rafts to make a bridge across the ThiÇn éc River, now known as the uÑng River, on their way toward the Phú L°¡ng River, i.e. the Red River, Emperor Nhân Tông once again ordered to  <i>fire cannons, shout loudly and challenge to fight</i> when he was personally commanding troops in the battle of Thng Long.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Secondly, though challenging the enemy to fight, Emperor Nhân Tông kept on establishing some corridor of relationship with the enemy for the purpose of carrying out his tactical intention and fathoming the enemy s situation. In <i>Yuan Shih</i>, the people having such names as NguyÅn Phång Ngñ and NguyÅn HiÇu NhuÇ are said to have carried Emperor Nhân Tông s letters to T o Huan but in reality they are not found in our history books. Instead, in <i> VSKTT</i> 5 only the name × Kh¯c Chung is mentioned.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Thirdly, the reason Emperor Nhân Tông could have such an active relationship with the enemy is that he had been capable of maintaining his entire armed forces after the battle of Bình Than. Thereafter, he concentrated all troops in Thng long to prepare for a strategic retreat into Thiên Tr°Ýng, where he could defend our people against the enemy s attack in three directions, that is, the armies commanded by T o Huan and A Li Hai Ya in the north-east, by Na Su La Ting (Nasir ud Din) in the north-west, and particularly by So Tu in the south.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">It was on the 14<sup>th</sup> of the 1<sup>st</sup> month of ¤t D­u (1285), when T o Huan entered our citadel to hold a party with his staff and then retreated to halt north of the Red River, that  <i>So Tu, T ang Wu Tai (Tangutai) & moved their troops to join with Chên Nan Wang</i> , as recorded in <i>Pen Chi</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 13, p.7a10-11. T ang Wu Tai was the general whom T o Huan, when commanding troops to advance, ordered to go to Champa with the task of telling So Tu to retreat his troops for a concentration of fighting forces, as recorded in <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209, p.5b12-13:  <i>ordering Tso Chêng T ang Wu Tai to go to Champa by post-horses, informing So Tu of the date of concentrating all the armed forces</i>. In reality, as it will be seen later, So Tu s troops could not move to the position of concentration in time; and only the major army commanded by T o Huan could gather in Thng Long to suffer the thundering counteroffensives by the troops and militiamen of ¡i ViÇt in the triumphant victories in Ch°¡ng D°¡ng, Tây K¿t, Hàm Tí.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Before the above-mentioned victories of our country over the Yuan army, T o Huan, in his headquarters in Thng Long, on the one hand,  <i>ordered Wan Hu Li Ping Hsien and Liu Shih Ying to command troops to open a route from Yung P ing into An Nam. Along the route within each 30 miles they set up a camp and within each 60 miles a station, where 300 men were regularly posted to hold and patrol. He also ordered Shih Ying to establish posts to handle camps and stations</i> , as recorded in <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209, p.7b7-9. It was one of their measures to secure the areas occupied by them but frequently harassed by our troops.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">On the other hand, also in the words of <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209 p.7b9-10, T o Huan ordered  <i>Yu Chêng Kuan Ch ê (Könäk) to command Wan Hu Mang Ku Tai (Manquadai) and Po Lo Ho Ta Er by land and Li Tso Chêng to command Wu Ma Er Pa Tu (Omar ba atur) by water</i> to pursue our troops withdrawal and and attack our positions along the Red River and the troops who were holding Thiên Tr°Ýng south of Thng Long. Thus, it was on the bank of Thiên M¡c that the first battle broke out.</span></p> <h6 style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">The Battle of à M¡c</span></h6> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">à M¡c or Thiên M¡c, which was later named M¡n Trù, is a bank of land along the Red River in what is now H°ng Yên Province. <i>Khâm Ënh ViÇt Sí Thông Giám C°¡ng Måc</i> 6 p.42a3-4 says:  <i>The Thiên M¡c River is the lower Phú L°¡ng at Bank M¡n Trù in ông Yên District of H°ng Yên Province</i>. There, our army set up a stronghold commanded by Tr§n Bình TrÍng. According to <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 4 p.54,  <i>On the 21<sup>st</sup>, Nhâm Thìn, [the Yuan troops] swept through the Thiên Hán frontier pass, cutting down General B£o Ngh)a H§u</i>. In reality, the Nhâm Thìn day of the 1<sup>st</sup> month of ¤t D­u must be the 19<sup>th</sup> and not the 21<sup>st</sup>. Certainly the number 19 was mistaken for 21 because they are very easy to be falsely copied. Regarding the name Thiên Hán, obviously the character <i>Hán</i> ("o) is the mistaken form of the character <i>M¡c</i> ( o) because they are of rather similar forms.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">In <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209, p.7b10, the date of the battle is not mentioned but it has an account of the battle and the capture of Ki¿n éc H§u Tr§n TrÍng by the Yuan army. In <i>Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzm Lu </i>of <i>Yuan Wen Lei</i> 41, p.27a6-7, the fact Tr§n TrÍng was captured is, too, recorded but dated after the battles of A L× and Thiên Tr°Ýng and before Emperor Nhân Tông s retreat to the mouth of Giao Thçy. Among them, the information taken from <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> is relatively correct because Lê Sñc wrote down what he could more or less participate and know.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Tr§n TrÍng, here, must be the national hero Tr§n Bình TrÍng in <i>VSKTT</i>. A single difference is that his title was B£o Ngh)a H§u instead of Ki¿n éc H§u as recorded in Chinese accounts. The title Ki¿n éc H§u might have been given to Tr§n Bình TrÍng when he was alive whereas B£o Ngh)a H§u was his posthumous title, conferred on him to praise a general s bravery and consistency in the face of the enemy s persuasion, which is clearly discussed below in <i>VSKTT</i>. That <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 4 p.54 has a different account concerning the fact above from that in <i>Yuan Shih</i> originates from the fact that Lê Sñc, who was then working with Ch°¡ng Hi¿n H§u Tr§n KiÇn in Vietnam when Tr§n Bình TrÍng was killed and then given the title, could know very clearly the latter s change of title.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">On the part of Yuan troops, their commander of this battle is nowhere mentioned. Yet, in Vietnamese history books a hero of ours in this battle was clearly recorded. In the words of <i>VSKTT</i>:  <i>B£o Ngh)a V°¡ng Tr§n Bình TrÍng (who, a descendant of Lê ¡i Hành, was the later husband of Princess Thåy B£o and whose father, an official under Thái Tông s reign, was given the  national surname Tr§n) died on behalf of his fighting against the enemy on the bank of à M¡c (namely, Thiên M¡c, present-day M¡n Trù). When captured, he refused eating. When asked by the enemy about our national affairs, he refused answering. Asked  Would you like to work as a  v°¡ng <a name="_ftnref4" title href="#_ftn4"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><b> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: CN-Times; vertical-align: baseline"> [4]</span></b></span></a> in the Northern Land? , he shouted loudly,  I would rather become a demon in the Southern Country than a v°¡ng in the Northern Land. Thereafter, he was killed.</i> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">The fundamental difference is that in <i>VSKTT</i> the battle of à M¡c and Tr§n Bình TrÍng s heroic death are dated the 2<sup>nd</sup> month of ¤t D­u, that is, after the surrenders of Ch°¡ng Ki¿n H§u Tr§n KiÇn and Lê Sñc, whereas according to Lê Sñc himself it is the Nhâm Thìn day of the 1<sup>st</sup> month of ¤t D­u. In this case, Lê Sñc s information appears to be more reliable if it is based on the course of military situation at that time. Further, he was contemporary with Tr§n Bình TrÍng and directly joined in some military activities at that time. Another reason is that it was not really necessary for him to change the date of the Yuan attack on our base at à M¡c.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Finally, as it has been said before, that Tr§n Bình TrÍng s death occurred a little before Lê Sñc s surrender, approximately more or less than a month, surely had a great impact on the latter. Indeed, according to <i> Khâm Ënh ViÇt Sí Thông Giám C°¡ng Måc</i> 7 p.36b2, on hearing of Tr§n Bình TrÍng s death Emperor Nhân Tông cried so sorrowfully. This points out that the death of Tr§n Bình TrÍng exerted a strong impact on the leading group of our country at that time. The title B£o Ngh)a H§u might have been conferred by Emperor Nhân Tông for the purpose of praising the unyielding spirit of a hero in a period when the emperor realized that there began to appear around him those who could not maintain some mutual affection between king and subjects, some loyalty to king and nation so that they might be ready to defect to the enemy at any time.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Moreover, concerning the battle of à M¡c what is mentioned in <i>VSKTT</i> was chiefly cited from <i>¡i ViÇt Sí Ký Tåc Biên</i> of Phan Phu Tiên, who could not have such favorable conditions as other historians when he was writing his own book. For that was the time when our country was dominated by the Ming for nearly twenty years and underwent many intense wars of liberation led by our patriots such as Tr§n Trùng Quang, NguyÅn BiÃu, Ph¡m NgÍc, Lê Lãi. Most of historical materials, therefore, must have been confiscated or destroyed by the enemy, especially those recorded by QuÑc Sí Quán of the Tr§n Dynasty, which we, today, cannot know exactly whether to have been hidden according to HÓ Quý Ly s plan or not. The most typical example is that the two wars of 1285 and 1288 were really the great wars of defense but they are described very plainly in <i>VSKTT</i>, let alone some points to be found completely false. For that reason it might not be surprising for readers at all to face the above-mentioned differences.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">In summary, the battle of à M¡c was not actually great. Yet, through it we can see not only the heroic, unyielding character of the commander Tr§n Bình TrÍng but also our people s resolution of defeating the enemy in a most difficult period of our country. It was due to such courageous and strenuous people that the later victories in the battles of Hàm Tí, Ch°¡ng D°¡ng, Tây K¿t, etc. could be gained.</span></p> <h6 style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">The battle of A L×</span></h6> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">According to <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 4 p.54, subsequent to the battle of à M¡c, in which Ki¿n éc H§u Tr§n TrÍng was captured,  <i>Th¿ Tí withdrew his troops to defend the frontier pass H£i ThË, ordering to set up poles for building a dam of defense on the west bank. Mandarins and troops stormed them with intersecting arrows shot from both above and below; they were broken down completely</i>. <i>Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzm Lu</i> in <i>Yuan Wen Lei</i> 41, p.27a6, says:  <i>[Our] Great Army pursued Nh­t Huyên on the rivers of A L× and éc C°¡ng</i>. Based on these two reports, the names H£i ThË and A L× obviously refer to the same place. Particularly in the words of <i>An Nan Chih Yuan</i> 1 p.47:  <i>The H£i TriÁu River in Khoái Châu is a tributary of the Hà L× River; its upper stream is connected with the NgÍc Châu River</i>. Here, Hà L× is no doubt the A L× River just mentioned in <i>Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzm Lu</i>. Concerning Khoái Châu, it was located in present-day H°ng Yên Province. And à M¡c, i.e. Thiên M¡c, is said in <i>Khâm Ënh ViÇt Sí Thông Giám C°¡ng Måc</i> 6, p.42a3-4, to be situated on the lower Red River in H°ng Yên Province. Thus, the two bases of à M¡c and A L× were close to each other. This might be the group of bases established for defending Thiên Tr°Ýng.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">With the detail  <i>intersecting arrows shot from both above and below</i> , it is evident that the enemy s two-pronged attack, on land and on water, commanded by K uan Ch ê and Li Hêng was aimed at pursuing the great army of Emperor Nhân Tông and storming into our base at A L× after occupying à M¡c. Once more, it was a battle that caused great loss for the enemy and drew them into the trap planned beforehand in our army s tactics.</span></p> <h6 style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">The Battle of ¡i Hoàng</span></h6> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">According to <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 4 p.54, following their victory at A L×,  <i>on the 3<sup>rd</sup>, inh Tõ, of the 2<sup>nd</sup> month, Chên Nan Wang broke Th¿ Tí s troops on the ¡i Hoàng River</i>. It was the first time T o Huan appeared in the area near Thiên Tr°Ýng. The ¡i Hoàng River, according to <i>An Nam Chí Nguyên</i> 1 p.42, is  <i>located in Lý Nhân Prefecture, where its upper stream is connected with the Lô River, its lower stream with the GiaoThçy or Phång Hóa Prefecture</i>. In <i>Khâm Ënh ViÇt Sí Thông Giám C°¡ng Måc</i>, a note on  Hoàng Giang says:  <i>The Hoàng River is in Nam X°¡ng District, its upper stream connected with the Thiên M¡c River, its lower stream with the Giao Thçy River.</i> Thus, due to its connection with Thiên M¡c, ¡i Hoàng or Hoàng Giang is one in a series of positions south of Thng Long established to defend Thiên Tr°Ýng.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">The battle that occurred there must have been extremely intense; for T o Huan himself moved his great army down from Thng Long to pursue our troops, who had also been concentrated at ¡i Hoàng and commanded not only by Emperor Nhân Tông but also by other generals such as Tr§n H°ng ¡o, Tr§n Quang Kh£i. On the part of our army, however, it was not really a counteroffensive but an enemy-exhausting combat for the purpose of keeping our troops withdrawal safe.</span></p> <h6 style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">The Military Situation in Thng Long after Our Army s Withdrawal</span></h6> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">The battles of A L× and ¡i Hoàng are not mentioned in <i> VSKTT</i>, but concerning the battle of à M¡c <i>VSKTT</i> 5 p.47a5-6 says:  <i>The enemy s forces were so violent that the two kings<a name="_ftnref5" title href="#_ftn5"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: CN-Times; vertical-align: baseline">[5]</span></b></span></a> had to retreat into Tam Tr) Nguyên in a small ship, ordering to drive it to NgÍc S¡n to deceive the enemy</i>. In reality, our troops in that situation were not so demoralized and the two kings not so isolated that they had to have such seemingly frightened actions. <i>Yuan Shih</i> 13 p.8b8-10 says:  <i>On the Bính Tý day of the 3<sup>rd</sup> month, Hu Nan Chan Ch êng Hsin Shêng requested for more men. Then, Tr§n Nh­t Huyên had fled to Thiên Tr°Ýng and Tr°Ýng Yên, ordering his troops to be concentrated again. H°ng ¡o V°¡ng gathered more than one thousand warships at V¡n Ki¿p whereas NguyÅn LÙc s troops were deployed at V)nh Bình. In the meantime, due to the long march of fighting for a long time, our mandarins and troops, who were like being  loosely hung between them, had to ask for more men since the troops of So Tu and T ang Wu Tai could not come in time. The reinforcement, by order of King, had to move by land since it would not be safe to move by water</i>. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Accordingly, after Emperor Nhân Tông withdrew from Thng Long and ordered troops to be concentrated at Thiên Tr°Ýng and Tr°Ýng Yên, the enemy fell into a very difficult situation. They themselves professed that they were being loosely hung in a thick net with which the troops of ¡i ViÇt would cover them at any time. In fact, the ¡i ViÇt army was developing their strategy of besieging and destroying these far-marching troops from three directions. The north wing was commanded by General NguyÅn LÙc and had great contributions to a battle that could break the hearts of those who were attempting to  rob and  sell our country as it will be seen below. The east wing was composed of warships deployed by Tr§n H°ng ¡o himself at V¡n Ki¿p to stop the enemy s eastward retreat. The third wing, consisting of the entire armed forces, was concentrated at Thiên Tr°Ýng and Tr°Ýng Yên, now known as Nam Ënh and Ninh Bình respectively, and commanded directly by Emperor Nhân Tông and his emperor-father Thánh Tông together with two famous generals, Tr§n Quang Kh£i and Tr§n Nh­t Du­t. It was the major front with complicated occurrences on our part as well as on the enemy s.</span></p> <h6 style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">Tr§n KiÇn, Tr§n Tú Viên, and Tr§n Vn LÙng Surrendering</span></h6> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">On the enemy s part, So Tu was urgently withdrawing his troops from Champa to the north by the order of T o Huan transmitted by T ang Wu Tai. On their way of retreat, there would be fierce combats with our troops as it will be seen below. On our part, subsequent to the battles and then withdrawals from Thng Long and other bases at à M¡c, A L× and ¡i Hoàng, some of the political and military leaders of ¡i ViÇt at that time began to show extremely puzzled, seemingly losing their confidence in the nation s potential strength and the brilliant leadership of Emperor Nhân Tông together with Emperor-Father Thánh Tông and such generals as Tr§n H°ng ¡o, Tr§n Quang Kh£i. Among those who sought to connect with the enemy for their surrender, the earliest traitor was Tr§n KiÇn with his accomplices. <i>VSKTT</i> 5 p.46b5-7 says:  <i>On the 1<sup>st</sup>, Giáp Thìn, of the 2<sup>nd</sup> month [of ¤t D­u], Tính QuÑc ¡i V°¡ng QuÑc Khang s elder son, Ch°¡ng Hi¿n H§u named KiÇt, and Lê Sñc took their families to surrender the Yuan army. By So Tu s order, they were brought to Yen Ching. At Camp Ma Låc, they were stopped and attacked by NguyÅn Th¿ LÙc and NguyÅn L)nh, the natives of L¡ng Giang. KiÇn was shot dead by a servant of H°ng ¡o V°¡ng s, NguyÅn Ëa Lô. Lê Sñc escaped in the night, having KiÇn s corpse carried on a horse. After riding about ten miles, he reached Khâu Ôn and had KiÇn buried there</i>. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">The fact is more clearly described in <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 4, p.54:  <i>Th¿ Tí ordered his younger brother, Chiêu Vn V°¡ng Tr§n Du­t and TrËnh ình Toàn to command troops in NghÇ An. Being defeated, they all ran away. In such an urgent situation, Th¿ Tí ordered his brother s son, Ch°¡ng Hi¿n H§u Tr§n KiÇn, to command the battlefield in Thanh Hóa. After long resistance, due to their weakness and lack of reinforcement, Ch°¡ng Hi¿n and Sñc surrendered.</i> Also in <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 13, pp.131-132:  <i>That winter (1284), Chên Nan Wang s great army marched into the [An Nam] country, defeating Th¿ Tí. Yu Chêng So Tu, advancing from Champa, attacked them in the rear. Extremely puzzled, Th¿ Tí had no other way than calling for Tr§n KiÇn and dispatching troops to him to fight against So Tu. Seeing that the troops were weak and there were no reinforcement, and further, without any information of whether Th¿ Tí was alive or not, KiÇn sent for Sñc, saying, </i> <i>Due to Th¿ Tí s refusal of attending the audience, the war broke out. In the face of danger, he is still not awakened. He would be pleased to see our country lost and our houses broken, wouldn t he? In the 1<sup>st</sup> month of the year that followed (1285), KiÇn together with Sñc s group of about some ten thousand people surrendered, handing in their weapons to Chên Nan Wang</i>. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Thus, Tr§n KiÇn s surrender was a very complicated event. For it was the first time when a descendant of the royal family, who was in charge of a great army on an important front in Thanh Hóa, surrendered the enemy. If it was not promptly resolved, such a fact might have a highly perilous impact, causing the collapse of the south front. As soon as he retreated from Thng long, Emperor Nhân Tông realized the importance of this front. Right after the 15<sup>th</sup> of the 1<sup>st</sup> month of ¤t D­u (1285), therefore, he urgently ordered Chiêu Vn V°¡ng Tr§n Nh­t Du­t to hold it.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">According to <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 4 p.54 and <i>Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzm Lu </i>of <i>Yuan Wen Lei</i> 41 p.27a5-6, by the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> month  <i>Ta Wang Chiao Ch i, Yu Chêng So Tu, Tso Chêng T ang Wu Tai, and Shan Chêng Hei Ti, who just retreated from Champa, penetrated into BÑ Chính Prefecture</i>. Thereafter, So Tu went on to advance to NghÇ An. Tr§n Nh­t Du­t s troops had to retreat because he could not resist them. <i>VSKTT</i> 5 p.46b4-5, therefore, says:  <i>On the 26<sup>th</sup>, H°ng ¡o V°¡ng asked [the King] for allowing Th°ãng T°Ûng Thái S° Tr§n Quang Kh£i to halt Yuan Shuai So Tu in NghÇ An</i>. It points out that shortly after Tr§n Nh­t Du­t urgently reported to our supreme headquarters on his failure to resist the enemy s forces, Emperor Nhân Tông appointed Tr§n Quang Kh£i to assist him. It was in this period that Tr§n KiÇn was given the command of troops in Thanh Hóa, where  <i>KiÇn led Sñc s group of ten thousand men with weapons to surrender Chên Nan Wang</i> according to <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 13 p.132.</span></p> <h6 style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">The Battle of Phú Tân</span></h6> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Also in <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 4, p.54, on the day that followed, i.e. the 2<sup>nd</sup>, ¤t Tõ, of the 2<sup>nd</sup> month of ¤t D­u (1285),  <i>Chiao Ch i commanded the cavalry to cross the gate of VÇ BÑ, liquidating troops of the Tr§n family and killing some of their officers, that is, inh Xa and NguyÅn T¥t ThÑng</i>. Then, also according to <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 3 p.54, on the 3<sup>rd</sup> day when T o Huan was attacking our base at ¡i Hoàng and Emperor Nhân Tông was retreating into Thiên Tr°Ýng, Tr§n Tú Viên and Tr§n Vn LÙng surrendered to the Yuan. Four days later, that is, the 6<sup>th</sup> of the 2<sup>nd</sup> month, as recorded in <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 4, p.54:  <i>on the 6<sup>th</sup> day, K÷ D­u, Chiao Ch i led Chang Hsien to attack the troops of Th¿ Tí s brother Tr§n Kh£i at the Phú Tân ferry, cutting off a thousand [men s] heads. [Other troops in] Thanh Hóa, NghÇ An surrendered</i>. This was the time when So Tu s troops could be united with T o Huan s as in the words of <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209 p.7b4-7:  <i>T ang Wu Tai together with So Tu s troops from Champa met with [T o Huan s] great army. Since they marched into ¡i ViÇt, they fought in seven battles, great and small, occupying more than two thousand miles of land, four palaces of the [An Nam] king. Earlier they had defeated the troops of Chiêu Minh V°¡ng. Chiêu Hi¿u V°¡ng and ¡i Liêu HÙ were killed. Chiêu Minh V°¡ng ran away, having no courage to appear again. In addition, they captured Tr§n Th°ãng Th°, and the son-in-law of L°¡ng Phång Ngñ of Giao ChÉ together with TriÇu M¡nh Tín, DiÇp Lang T°Ûng and more than four hundred descendants of the Sung family-in-exile in NghÇ An, DiÅn Châu, Thanh Hóa, Tr°Ýng Yên</i>. </span></p> <p class="MsoBodyText2" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: CN-Times">Accordingly, Tr§n KiÇn had led Chiao Ch i to attack the Phú Tân base commanded by Th°ãng T°Ûng Tr§n Quang Kh£i with his son, Vn Túc V°¡ng ¡o T£i, and his nephew, T£ Thiên V°¡ng éc ViÇp. Before Tr§n Quang Kh£i retreated from the base, Chiêu Hi¿u V°¡ng and ¡i Liêu HÙ were killed.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Thus, the fact that Tr§n KiÇn surrendered to the enemy had a great impact on our army. On the southern front such famous generals as Tr§n Quang Kh£i, Tr§n Nh­t Du­t gradually withdrew from Thanh Hóa and NghÇ T)nh toward Thiên Tr°Ýng. After the battle of ¡i Hoàng on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of the 2<sup>nd</sup> month of ¤t D­u (1285) and the battle of Phú Tân on the 6<sup>th</sup>, Emperor Nhân Tông together with Tr§n H°ng ¡o and Tr§n Quang Kh£i launched a strategic withdrawal. Before his declaration of this withdrawal as a postponement of military actions, Emperor Nhân Tông ordered Trung Hi¿u H§u Tr§n D°¡ng and NguyÅn NhuÇ to negotiate with T o Huan and, at the same time, ordered his servant, ào Kiên, to offer Princess An T° to Chên Nan Wang for the purpose of  <i>relieving the country s disaster</i>. Thereby, T o Huan ordered Ch ien Hu Ai to persuade Emperor Nhân Tông to attend the negotiation but the latter refused, as recorded in <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 4, p.54. In <i>VSKTT</i> 5, p.47a1, the fact of offering Princess An T° is mentioned but dated before the battle of à M¡c.</span></p> <h6 style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: CN-Times">The Strategic Retreat into Thanh Hóa</span></h6> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">Thus, after the battles of ¡i Hoàng and Phú Tân the major armed forces of ¡i ViÇt, besides the units posted in regional stations, were first concentrated in Thiên Tr°Ýng and then withdrawn strategically at the river-mouth of Giao Thçy, as recorded in <i>An Nan Chuan</i> of <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209 p.7b10-11. Also it is said in <i>Yuan Shih</i> that the Yuan did not know where our army moved. Then on page 7b11-12, it says:  <i>Some of Tông s relatives such as Vn Ngh)a H§u with his father Vi ¡o H§u, his son Minh Trí H§u and Seng Shan Chêng, a mandarin of the Sung-in-exile, Tô Thi¿u B£o s son named Tô B£o Ch°¡ng, and Tr§n Th°ãng Th° s son named Tr§n ình Tôn all surrendered</i>. Thus, the fact that Vn Ngh)a H§u, i.e. Tr§n Tú Viên, defected to the enemy occurred on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of the 3<sup>rd</sup> month of ¤t D­u (1285) as recorded above by <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 4 p.54.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">According to <i>Yuan Shih</i> 209 pp.7b13-8a3, it was these traitors that supplied information for T o Huan:  <i>Reaching the An Bang estuary, Nh­t Huyên gave up his ship, oars, armor, and cane to race into the mountains. Mandarins and troops captured ten thousand ships, the good ones of which were used, the remaining burned. Then, after three days pursuit on land, our army captured alive some men, saying that the emperor-father [i.e. Thánh Tông] and Th¿ Tí had only four ships left, H°ng ¡o V°¡ng and his son three ships, Thái S° [Tr§n Nh­t Du­t] eighty ships, all moved to Thanh Hóa. Wu Ma Er Pa Tu commanded 1300 men and 60 ships to help So Tu pursue Thái S° s troops</i>. Thus, this is obviously a withdrawal on a grand scale, a strategic one carried out by Emperor Nhân Tông, his emperor-father, Tr§n H°ng ¡o and Tr§n Quang Kh£i.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> <span lang="EN-US">When did the withdrawal take place then? <i>An Nam Chí L°ãc</i> 4 p.54 says:  <i>On the 9<sup>th</sup>, Nhâm NgÍ, of the 3<sup>rd</sup> month, on a sea patrol with naval troops in Tam Tr), Chiao Ch i and T ang Wu Tai nearly captured Th¿ Tí</i>. In the words of <i>VSKTT</i> 5 p.47a5-6, however, the withdrawal of ¡i ViÇt troops into Tam Tr) (i.e. the Ba Ch» Mountains in Qu£ng Ninh) took place toward the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> month. Also according to <i>VSKTT</i> 5 p.47b4-5, on the 1<sup>st</sup>,